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INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PERSONS LIABLE:
THE NORTH DAKOTA DRAM SHOP STATUTE DOES NOT
SUPERSEDE THE COMMON LAW DUTY OF A TAVERNKEEPER
TO INTERVENE IN A BAR FIGHT
Zueger v. Carlson, 542 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1996)
I. FACTS
On October 29, 1993, Lillian Zueger and LeRoy Kudrna were
injured in a fight at Boomers, a bar in Mandan, North Dakota. 1 Mark
Carlson, an off-duty bouncer at Boomers, attacked Zueger and Kudrna,
causing permanent injuries. 2 Zueger and Kudrna later retained counsel
and sent a demand letter to Boomers. 3 Boomers had two insurance
policies, a dram shop liability policy and a comprehensive premises
liability policy. 4 Zueger and Kudrna settled their dram shop claim with
Boomers for $10,000, paid from the dram shop liability policy. 5 Along
with the settlement, the parties signed a release that specifically provided
that Zueger and Kudrna were releasing only their dram shop claims, and
leaving open claims under Boomers' premises liability policy. 6
1. Zueger v. Carlson, 542 N.W.2d 92, 93 (N.D. 1996).
2. Id. Zueger and Kudrna alleged that Carlson approached Kudrna and asked him whether
Zueger was his wife. Appellant's Brief at 7, Zueger v. Carlson, 542 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1996) (No.
950205). After Kudrna replied that Zueger was his girlfriend, Carlson asked whether he could dance
with Zueger. Id. Kudma answered "go ahead, if she wants to." Id. While the parties differ there-
after as to what was said, independent witnesses confirmed that Carlson suddenly struck Zueger in the
face with his fist. Id. The sudden blow caused Zueger to fall to the floor and hit her head on the foot
of the bar. Id. Carlson began kicking Zueger in the head while she lay on the floor, screaming for
help. Id. In the meantime, while Kudrna was in the process of attempting to come to Zueger's aid,
Carlson struck Kudma in the face, causing Kudrna to fall to the floor. Id. Carlson then began kicking
Kudma in the head. Id.
3. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Zueger (No. 950205).
4. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 93. The dram shop liability policy was with Acceptance Insurance
Company, and the comprehensive general liability policy was with Capital Indemnity Corporation. Id.
5. See id. In negotiations with Zueger's and Kudrna's attorneys both insurance companies indi-
vidually alleged that the other company's coverage should primarily apply. See Appellant's Brief at 2.
Zueger (No. 950205). Zueger and Kudrna eventually reached a partial settlement with Acceptance,
the dram shop carrier, in the amount of $10,000. Id.
6. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Zueger (No. 950205). The relevant portion of the release states:
The undersigned . . . do hereby . . . FOREVER DISCHARGE'Acceptance Insurance
Company, Boomers .... and all others who may be liable ... from any dram shop claim
against Boomers, arising out of personal injuries received by Lillian Zueger and Lee
Kudrna at Boomers on October 29, 1993. This release includes any damages by Lillian
Zueger or Lee Kudrna for personal injuries, physical pain and mental anguish,
permanent injuries, past and future medical or other bills, lost income or earning
capacity, or any other damages whatsoever, resulting or to result from an incident
involving an assault on Lillian Zueger and Lee Kudma at Boomers .... as a result of
Boomers' dramshop liability. This release does not include a release of Lillian Zueger
and Lee Kudrna's claim against Boomers under Boomers' premises liability policy for
any claims for negligent security, failure to provide adequate security, failure to stop an
assault or any other premises liability claims. This release is a release of Lillian Zueger
and Lee Kudma's dramshop claim only against Boomers.
Appellant's Brief app. at 24, Zueger (No. 950205) (emphasis added).
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After settling their dramshop claim, Zueger and Kudrna brought an
action in Morton County District Court on their remaining claims against
Carlson and Boomers. 7 In their action, Zueger and Kudrna asserted that
Boomers failed to provide adequate security and that Boomers'
employees and security personnel failed to come to their aid during the
attack. 8 Zueger and Kudma further asserted that the assault was stopped
only when other patrons managed to restrain Carlson. 9 Boomers moved
for summary judgment, asserting that the premises liability claims were,
in fact, dram shop claims by another name. 10 The district court con-
cluded that the North Dakota dram shop statutell superseded all other
forms of tavernkeeper liability, and that Zueger and Kudrna had failed
to establish any common law duty of a tavernkeeper to provide adequate
security on its premises.12 The district court granted Boomers' motion
for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against Boomers.13
Zueger and Kudrna appealed the court's decision.14 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed, and held that a release of dram shop claims
does not release all tort claims against a bar,15 and further held that a
7. See Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 94.
8. See id. at 93. Zueger and Kudrna alleged that Boomers personnel not only failed to come to
their aid, but also that Boomers personnel actually restrained Kudrna from coming to the aid of
Zueger, while Carlson was assaulting Zueger. Appellant's Brief app. at 28, Zueger (No. 950205).
9. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 93. Plaintiffs alleged that Kudrna was the first person to attempt to
come to Zueger's aid. Appellant's Brief app. at 29, Zueger (No. 950205). However, when Kudrna
approached Carlson, Carlson struck Kudma in the face, knocking Kudrna to the floor. Id.
10. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 94. Specifically, defendant argued that summary judgment should be
granted for the following reasons: the common law has been superseded by the dram shop statute; the
release of any dram shop liability releases all potential liability; plaintiffs cannot split their dram shop
claims from their negligence claims; and the plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege a basis for liability
separate and apart from the sale of alcohol. Appellant's Brief app. at 18-23, Zueger (No. 950205).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987). Section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code
states that:
Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any
obviously intoxicated person has a claim for relief for fault under section 32-03.2-02
against any person who knowingly disposes, sells, barters, or gives away alcoholic
beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously
intoxicated person, and if death ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to
damages defined in section 32-21-02. No claim for relief pursuant to this section may be
had on behalf of the intoxicated person nor on behalf of the intoxicated person's estate
or personal representatives; nor may a claim for relief be had on behalf of an adult
passenger in an automobile driven by an intoxicated person or on behalf of the
passenger's estate or personal representatives.
Id.
12. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 94.
13. Id. Judgment was entered dismissing all claims against Boomers, only after Zueger, Kudrna,
and Carlson stipulated to the dismissal of all claims against Carlson. Appellant's Brief app. at 38,
Zueger (No. 950205). The stipulation apparently arose out of Zueger's and Kudrna's desire to appeal
the district court's decision. Id. Boomers had filed a motion to dismiss Zueger's and Kudrna's first
attempted appeal on the basis that final judgment had not been entered because Mark Carlson still
remained a party to the case. Id. at 5.
14. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 94.
15. Id. at 97.
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tavernkeeper has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent and stop
assaults on its patrons.16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In most states, 17 when an intoxicated tavern patron assaults another
person, the assaulted person may bring an action against a tavernkeeper
under a statutorily imposed duty of a tavernkeeper not to serve an
obviously intoxicated person. 18 However, an alternative or supplemental
cause of action may exist through common law principles of premises
liability.19
A. DRAM SHOP LIABILITY
At common law, no remedy existed for injuries to persons resulting
from the sale of alcohol, either on the basis that the sale was a direct
wrong, or on the grounds of negligence. 20 The rationale for the rule is
that the consumption of the alcohol, not the sale itself, is the proximate
cause of the purchaser's injuries.2 ' To fill the void of the common law,
many states have enacted dram shop statutes imposing civil liability on
alcohol providers. 22
16. Id.
17. See infra note 22 (providing citations of existing state dram shop laws).
18. See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1995) (discussing tavernkeeper
liability under dram shop acts). These statutes are commonly known as "dramshop acts" or "civil
damage acts." Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 494 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "dram-shop" as
"[a] drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises; a bar or saloon"). A
"dram" is defined as "[a] drink of some substance containing alcohol; something which can produce
intoxication. An apothecary system measurement of fluid, roughly equivalent to four or five cc, or
one teaspoonful." Id.
19. See Manuel v. Weitzman, 191 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Mich. 1971) (holding a tavemkeeper liable
under principles of premises liability as well as the Michigan state dram shop act for a third person
assault); see also Joan Teshima, Annotation, Tavernkeeper's Liability to Patron for Third Person's
Assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 281, 308 (1986 & Supp. 1996) (discussing different theories of fault for third
person assaults in taverns, including premises liability).
20. Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39, 47 (N.D. 1994); see also Daphne D. Sipes, The Emergence
of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A Comparative Study, 8 REV. LrG. 1, 3-6 (1988) (comparing
different state laws that hold a tavernkeeper liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated third person).
21. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47 (citing 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969)).
22. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-70 to -71 (1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 04.21.020, 04.16.030 (Michie 1994);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-301, 4-311 to -312 (West 1995); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602,
25602.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 12-46-112.5, -47-128.5 (West 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-103 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-18, -40 (Harrison 1994); IDAHO CODE §
23-808 (1995); 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-21 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5
(Michie 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.49, .92 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
413.241 (Michie 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 2501-2516 (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 436.22 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 67-3-73
(1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-710, 16-6-305(4) (1995);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-F: I to :8 (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:22A-l to -7 (West 1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Michie 1996); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -129 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4399.01, .02, .07, .08, .18 (Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.950 to .960 (1995); PA. STAT.
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Typically, dramshop acts provide for recovery against a provider of
alcohol for injury or damage by an intoxicated person or in conse-
quence of the intoxication of a person.23 Each of these two formulas has
its own significance. 24 In actions brought for an injury inflicted by an
intoxicated person, the courts are virtually unanimous in holding that it
is not necessary for the intoxication to be the proximate cause of the
injury. 25 However, in actions brought for an injury inflicted in conse-
quence of a person's intoxication, some courts have held that there can
be no recovery unless the intoxication was the proximate cause, or at
least a contributing cause of the injury. 26
The current North Dakota dram shop statute, 27 which was amended
in 1987, retains the language "injured by any obviously intoxicated
person," and no longer contains the words "in consequence of the
intoxication." 28 Thus, in North Dakota the proper level of causation
ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-14-1 to -13 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
57-10-101 to -102 (1989); TEx. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.01 to .03 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §
32A-14-101 (1994 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 501 to 507 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
125.035 to .037 (West 1989); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-502 (Michie 1996).
23. See Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47 (quoting Thompson v. Wogan, 33 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Il1. 1941)
(discussing the difference between injury caused by an intoxicated person and injury caused in
consequence of the intoxication of a person)); Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474, 476
(N.D. 1986) (demonstrating that prior to 1987, section 5-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code
"unambiguously provide[d] two grounds for recovery of damages: (1) injury 'by any intoxicated
person'; or (2) injury 'in consequence of intoxication."'); H.B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Liability of
Liquor Furnisher Under Civil Damage or Dramshop Act for Injury or Death of Intoxicated Person from
Wrongful Act of a Third Person, 65 A.L.R. 2d 923, 924 (1954) (examining liability based on the two
formulas).
24. Stewart 520 N.W.2d at 47; Chermside, supra note 23, at 925.
25. Meshefski, 385 N.W.2d at 476 (quoting Chermside, supra note 23, at 925). The Meshefski
court stated "[i]t is enough that the injury was by an intoxicated person, regardless of whether it would
have been committed by him if sober. In other words, if by an intoxicated person, it is not necessary to
prove that the injury was in consequence of intoxication." Id. (quoting Lee v. Hederman, 138 N.W.
893, 894 (Iowa 1912)). The practical effect of the Meshefski decision was to remove the requirement
of proximate causation from North Dakota's dram shop act. See id.
26. See Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47 (stating that in order for a dram shop action to be viable, the
dram shop violation must have contributed to the intoxicated person's intoxication, and the plaintiffs
injury must have been inflicted by the intoxicated person); Chermside, supra note 23, at 925 (noting
that proximate cause becomes relevant only in situations concerning in consequence oft). In reality, an
injury inflicted in consequence of a person's intoxication must necessarily be inflicted by an intoxi-
cated person. See Meshefski, 385 N.W.2d at 476-77. The distinction is only relevant to causation. Id.
While the distinction seems slight, some courts have held that it is reversible error for the court to fail
to distinguish between injury by an intoxicated person and injury in consequence of the intoxicated
person in a dram shop action. See id. This was the case in Meshefski, where the trial court gave a
jury instruction that only dealt with injury as a result of intoxication. Id. The North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that the instruction constituted reversible error. Id. at 477.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987).
28. Id. Compare this with the pre-1987 dram shop statute:
Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any
intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication, has a claim for relief against any
person who caused such intoxication by disposing, selling, bartering, or giving away
alcoholic beverages contrary to statute for all damages sustained, and in the event death
ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to damages defined in section
32-21-02.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 05-01-06 (1985) (amended 1987) (emphasis added).
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requires that the dram shop violation 29 must have contributed to the
intoxicated person's intoxication, and that the intoxicated person must
have inflicted the injury. 30 A showing of proximate causation between
the intoxication and the injury is no longer a requirement in North
Dakota dram shop actions. 31
Another significant difference between the pre-1987 and 1987
dramshop act is the 1987 act's incorporation of the North Dakota
comparative fault statute. 32 In this statutory scheme, the dram shop act
specifies the conduct necessary to establish a dram shop violation. 33
These causal requirements are also retained in the comparative fault
statute, for the purpose of allocating fault among those persons contrib-
uting to the injury. 34
The North Dakota Supreme Court has noted that the dram shop act
is remedial in nature and should be construed to suppress the mischief
29. Under the current dram shop act, a "violation" consists of knowingly selling, bartering, or
giving away alcoholic beverages to either a minor, an incompetent, or an obviously intoxicated person.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1. Pertaining to the "obviously intoxicated person" prong, the standard for
determining whether a provider of alcohol provided the alcohol knowingly is as follows:
[T]he person to whom the sale is made must be intoxicated to such an extent that the
seller, using his usual and reasonable powers of observation, sees or should see that the
buyer is intoxicated. In other words, there must be such outward manifestation of
intoxication that a person using his reasonable powers of observation can see or should
see that such person has become intoxicated.
Jore v. Saturday Night Club, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 889, 895 (N.D. 1975) (quoting Strand v. Village of
Watson, 72 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 1955)). In Jore, the court noted that there is a manifest
difference between the term "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" as used in traffic laws, and
the term "obviously intoxicated." Id.
30. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46-47. Therefore, the level of causation in the 1987 dram shop act
has remained the same since the Meshefski interpretation of the pre-1987 dram shop act.
3 1. Id. at 47. But see id. at 50 (Levine, J., concurring in part and in the result) (stating that the
legislature intended basic tort principles of causation to apply to dram shop actions, including
proximate cause).
32. Id. at 46 (discussing the use of North Dakota Century Code § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995)). Cf.
Feuerherm v. Ertelt, 286 N.W.2d 509, 511 (N.D. 1979) (stating that comparative negligence does not
apply to actions brought under the dram shop act). North Dakota's comparative fault statute, section
32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, states that:
Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an action by any person to recover damages
for death or injury to person or property unless the fault was as great as the combined
fault of all other persons who contribute to the injury, but any damages allowed must be
diminished in proportion to the amount of contributing fault attributable to the person
recovering . . . Under this section, fault includes negligence, malpractice, absolute
liability, dram shop liability, failure to warn, reckless or willful conduct, assumption of
risk, misuse of product, failure to avoid injury, and product liability, including product
liability involving negligence or strict liability or breach of warranty for product defect.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
33. See Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 47 (noting that the level of causation requires that the dram shop
violation must have contributed to the intoxicated person's intoxication, and that the intoxicated person
must have inflicted the plaintiff s injury).
34. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46.
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and advance the remedy. 35 Therefore, to accommodate this objective,
the court has construed the dram shop act broadly. 36
B. PREMISES LIABILITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO OR A SUPPLEMENT TO A
DRAM SHOP CLAIM
As an alternative or a supplement to a dramshop action, a plaintiff
may bring a claim based on a tavernkeeper's premises liability. 3 7
Generally, dram shop acts afford an exclusive remedy for injuries arising
out of an unlawful sale, gift, or furnishing of alcohol. 38 Dram shop acts,
however, do not abrogate the duty of tavernkeepers to maintain safe
conditions for their patrons. 39
There is generally no duty to protect others against harm from third
persons, absent a special relationship.4 0 However, the relationship be-
tween a tavernkeeper and a tavern patron is custodial in nature. 4 1 The
general rule is that a tavernkeeper, although not an insurer of the safety
of its patrons, has a common law duty independent of the dram shop act
to exercise reasonable care to protect patrons from reasonably foreseeable
35. Id. (citing lszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1957)).
36. See, e.g., Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687, 689 (N.D. 1994) (holding social hosts liable
under the dram shop act for assaults by third persons).
37. See generally Teshima, supra note 19, at 288 (discussing different theories of fault for third
person assaults in taverns, including premises liability).
38. 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 561 (1969).
39. See Manuel v. Weitzman, 191 N.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Mich. 1971) (allowing a dram shop
action and a common law premises liability action to be joined into one single action). Taverns, just
like bars, theaters, parking garages, hotels, and stores, have a duty to maintain safe conditions for their
patrons. Martin J. Rooney, Liability of a Premises Owner for the Provision of Security: The
Massachusetts Experience, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).
40. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984).
41. Id. (distinguishing between protective and custodial relationships). Protective relationships
require the defendant to guard its charge against harm from others. Id. For example, "the duty of a
carrier toward its passengers may require it to maintain order in its trains and stations, and to use
reasonable care to prevent not only conduct which is merely negligent, but also physical attacks or
thefts of property on the part of other passengers or strangers." Id. Custodial relationships, on the
other hand, require the defendant to control its charge and to guard other persons against its dangerous
propensities. Id. For example, "[a] tavern keeper must act reasonably to prevent intoxicated patrons
from injuring others." Id.
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injury at the hands of other patrons. 42 To determine if an injury was
foreseeable, many courts have considered the tests set out in Nevin v.
Carlasco.43 These tests include whether a tavernkeeper: 1) allowed on
the premises a patron with a known propensity for fighting; 2) allowed a
patron whose conduct had become too aggressive to remain on the prem-
ises; 3) failed to act after being warned of a patron's threat; 4) tolerated
disorderly conditions; 5) failed to intervene in a fight as soon as pos-
sible; 6) failed to provide an adequate staff to police the premises; or 7)
failed to summon police.44 A tavernkeeper's duty to maintain safe con-
ditions for patrons is triggered if one or more of these factors are met.45
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Zueger v. Carlson,46 the North Dakota Supreme Court faced two
issues. 47 First, whether a tavernkeeper has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent and stop assaults on tavern patrons. 48 The court answered
42. See Manuel, 191 N.W.2d at 477-78. A tavernkeeper's liability for assaults upon its patrons is
often premised upon section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is
subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to
protect them against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965). Comment "f" to section 344 clarifies the extent of the
duty:
f. Duty to police premises. Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he
is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that
the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however,
know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct
on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor,
even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the
place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should
reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against
it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable
protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965).
43. 365 P.2d 637, 638 (Mont. 1961); see generally Teshima, supra note 19, at 289 (referring to
Nevin v. Carlasco, 365 P.2d 637 (Mont. 1961)).
44. See Teshima, supra note 19, at 289 (quoting Nevin, 365 P.2d at 638).
45. Nevin v. Carlasco, 365 P.2d 637, 638 (Mont. 1961).
46. 542 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1996).
47. Zueger v. Carlson, 542 N.W.2d 92, 93 (N.D. 1996). The Appellant phrased the issues as
follows:
I. Whether the district court erred in holding that Boomers owed no duty to come
to the aid of the plaintiffs or to provide reasonable security services on its
premises.
I. Whether the district court erred in holding that passage of the dram shop act
extinguished all other forms of common law premises liability for tavern owners.
Appellant's Brief at 1, Zueger (No. 950205) (capitalization altered).
48. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 93.
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this question in the affirmative, noting that this duty is triggered when an
assault is foreseeable.49 Second, the court faced the issue of whether a
release of dram shop claims releases all tort claims against a bar.50 The
court answered this question in the negative, noting that Boomers ex-
pressly consented to keeping Zueger's and Kudrna's premises liability
claims open, and noting that dram shop statutes do not supersede
common law negligence actions.51
A. TAVERNKEEPER'S DUTY TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO
PREVENT AND STOP ASSAULTS ON TAVERN PATRONS
A tavernkeeper's duty to protect patrons from third party assaults
was an issue of first impression for the North Dakota Supreme Court. 52
The court noted that liability of a tavernkeeper for assaults upon patrons
is often premised upon section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 53 and Comment "f' of the Restatement. 54 The court agreed with
other courts that have relied upon section 344 to conclude that a tavern-
keeper owes a duty to patrons to protect them from assaults by other
patrons "when the owner has reasonable cause to anticipate conduct on
the part of third persons which is likely to endanger the safety of
patrons."55
The court noted that Zueger had asserted that Boomers knew that
fights had occurred on the premises in the past, that Carlson was a violent
49. Id. at 97.
50. Id. at 93.
51. Id. at 97.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Id. (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344, (1965)).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965).
55. Id. at 97 (citing Cotterhill v. Baffle, 865 P.2d 120, 122-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Observatory
Corp. v. Daly, 780 P.2d 462, 468-69 (Colo. 1989); Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 34-35 (Fla.
1983); Lucht v. Stage 2, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill. 1992); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, 856
P.2d 1332, 1337 (Kan. 1993); Sweenor v. 162 State St., Inc., 281 N.E.2d 280, 281-82 (Mass. 1972);
Bencivenga v. J.J.A.M.M., Inc. 609 A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Stevens v.
Kirby, 450 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (App. Div. 1982); Jones v. Oberg, 628 P.2d 773, 775-76 (Or. 1981)).
Zueger and Kudma also argued an alternative basis, aside from section 344 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, for finding a duty of a tavernkeeper to come to the aid of its patron. Appellant's
Brief at 11, Zueger (No. 950205). This argument arises out of section 322 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states:
If the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether tortious or
innocent, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless and in
danger of further harm, the actor is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
such further harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965); see also South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290
N.W.2d 819, 837 (N.D. 1980) (holding a railroad liable, under Section 322 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, for its engineer's failure to aid an automobile passenger whose automobile was
struck by a train). Zueger and Kudma argued that Boomers knew that Carlson was a violent person
and that, by allowing Carlson to remain in the bar, Boomers subjected Zueger and Kudrna to bodily
harm. Appellant's Brief at 12, Zueger (No. 950205). This knowledge gave Boomers a duty, indepen-
dent of its duty under dram shop, to intervene in the fight and minimize the plaintiff's harm. Id. The
court did not address this theory in its opinion. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 92.
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person, and that Carlson had been involved in previous fights at
Boomers. 56 This was enough to raise material issues of fact on the fore-
seeability of the assault. 57 The court stated that the district court erred in
ruling, as a matter of law, that Boomers had no duty to protect Zueger
and Kudrna from Carlson's attack or to intervene once it began. 58
B. RELEASE OF DRAM SHOP CLAIMS-THE DRAM SHOP ACT DOES NOT
SUPERSEDE ALL COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF A TAVERNKEEPER
Boomers argued that the dram shop act supersedes all common law
liability of a tavernkeeper. 59 Therefore, Boomers contended, the release
of Zueger's and Kudrna's dram shop claims released Boomers from all
liability arising from the assault. 60 Boomers based their argument on
two different grounds. 61 First, Boomers relied on section 1-01-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code,62 which purports to abolish common law in
cases where the law is declared by code.63
The court rejected this theory on the ground that dram shop laws
are sui generis.64 The court stated that the legislature intended to create
56. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 97.
57. Id. The court stated, "If the assault was foreseeable, Boomers had a duty to use reasonable
care to protect its patrons from injury. Even if the specific attack was not foreseeable, Boomers had a
duty once the attack began to exercise reasonable care to stop the attack." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 95-96.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987).
63. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987)). Boomers also quoted
Thoring v. Bottonsek, which referred to section 1-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code in conclud-
ing that "[c]ommon law has been superseded by the dram shop act." Appellee's Brief at 10, Zueger
(No. 950205) (quoting Thoring v. Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586, 588 (N.D. 1984)). In Thoring, Michael
Bottonsek, a North Dakota resident, drove to Montana and consumed alcohol in a Montana tavern.
Thoring v. Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586, 587 (N.D. 1984). While returning to North Dakota the next
morning, Bottonsek drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a North Dakota highway and collided
head-on with another vehicle. Id. Plaintiff's decedent, a passenger in Bottensek's car, died as a result
of the collision. Id. Plaintiff brought suit in North Dakota against Bottonsek and the Montana tavern
that served Bottonsek. Id. The court stated that since North Dakota's dram shop statute does not have
an extraterritorial effect, the only way a Montana tavern could be held liable would be either through
North Dakota or Montana common law. Id. at 588. The court noted that, under section 1-01-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code, common law was superseded by the dram shop act. Id. Therefore, the
court concluded the only way to hold a Montana tavern liable would be through Montana common
law, which was nonexistent at the time. Id.
In district court, Zueger and Kudrna opposed Boomers' motion for summary judgment and
argued that "common law" under Thoring and section 1-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code
refers to a cause of action for the negligent sale of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person.
Appellant's Brief app. at 30, Zueger (No. 950205). Zueger and Kudrna contended that their common
law claim was not for the negligent sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person. Id. Rather, their common
law claim pertained to Boomers' failure to come to the aid of an invitee on its premises. Id. In
Zueger, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not address Thoring v. Bottonsek.
64. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95 (citing Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39, 45 (N.D. 1994); Day v.
General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 355 (N.D. 1984)). "Sui generis" is defined as "[o]f its own
kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind; peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed.
1990) (emphasis original).
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a new, distinct cause of action unrelated to any recognized by the
common law. 65 The court also noted that the dram shop act does not
purport to cover the entire field of bar owner liability. 66 The court
therefore reasoned that it is axiomatic that the legislature did not intend
to supersede unrelated premises liability actions against tavernkeepers. 67
Boomers' second argument in favor of the proposition that the
dram shop act supersedes all common law liability of a tavernkeeper
arose out of language in the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision of
Stewart v. Ryan.68 The court in Stewart stated that "negligence, willful
conduct, and dram shop liability are all integrated." 69 Boomers asserted
that the express language in Stewart indicates that, under the 1987
statutory amendments, the dram shop act includes all forms of liability.70
The court rejected this argument, noting that a careful reading of
the relevant portion of Stewart clarifies that negligence, willful conduct,
and dram shop liability are integrated only for fault allocation under
comparative fault.7 1 The court further noted that Stewart expressly
stated that negligence is a separate theory from dram shop liability. 72
65. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95 (citing Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D. 1989)).
66. Id. The court indicated that if the dram shop statute had intended, either expressly or implicit-
ly, to cover the entire field of bar owner liability, then a basis might exist for superseding the common
law. Id. (citing Board of County Comm'r v. Peterson Excavating, Inc., 406 N.W.2d 674, 675-76
(N.D. 1987)). In Peterson Excavating, the court stated "if a particular statute is so designed that it
covers the entire field to which it relates, it does so to the exclusion of the common law." Peterson
Excavating, 406 N.W.2d at 676 (quoting In re White, 284 N.W. 357, 358 (N.D. 1939)).
67. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95. The court quoted a case from the Supreme Court of Michigan,
stating:
The common law duty of a liquor establishment to maintain a safe place of business for
its customers is the same duty any business owes to those it invites upon its premises. The
dram shop act was not intended to affect that duty. Dram shop acts were passed because
under the common law it was not a tort to sell or furnish intoxicating liquor to an ordinary
able-bodied man, even though as a result of his becoming intoxicated injury resulted to
himself or to others. Their purpose was to fill a void in the law, not to remove the well-
recognized duty of a tavern keeper to exercise due care for the welfare and safety of
invited patrons.
Id. (quoting Manuel v. Weitzman, 191 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Mich. 1971) (footnote omitted)).
68. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 96 (referring to Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1994)).
69. Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46. The relevant portion of the text that Boomers relied upon is as
follows:
The dram shop amendments specifically incorporate the requirement of N.D.C.C. §
32-03.2-02, for allocation of fault among all persons 'who contributed to the injury.'
Sections 32-03.2-01 and 32-03.2-02, N.D.C.C., expressly define 'fault' in terms of
'negligence,' 'reckless or willful conduct,' and 'dram shop liability.' That definition indi-
cates that negligence remains a separate theory from dram shop liability, and contem-
plates that negligence, willful conduct, and dram shop liability are all integrated for the
allocation of fault among those 'who contributed to the injury.'... The Legislature has
therefore recognized that a person's willful or criminal conduct does not automatically
extinguish dram shop fault and, instead, is an integrated part of the allocation of fault
among those 'who contributed to the injury.'
Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95-96 (quoting Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46 (emphasis added)).
70. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 96.
71. Id. (quoting Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46).
72. Id. (quoting Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46).
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The court therefore concluded that dram shop statutes do not supersede
all common law liability of tavernkeepers. 73
Boomers finally asserted that it would be an improper splitting of a
cause of action to allow Zueger and Kudrna to pursue common law
claims after releasing their dram shop claims.7 4 The court rejected this
argument, noting that the general rule against splitting a cause of action
does not apply because the defendant had consented to the splitting of
the claim. 75
IV. IMPACT
The court's decision in Zueger v. Carlson effectively brings North
Dakota in accord with the majority of state case law that allows a person
injured by an obviously intoxicated third person to bring a claim against
a tavernkeeper based on premises liability. 76 The court deemed it
axiomatic that tavernkeepers have a duty to prevent and stop assaults on
their patrons. 77 The court further held that a release of dram shop
claims does not release all tort claims against a bar. 78 These two hold-
ings, taken together, will increase a plaintiff's likelihood of recovery in
alcohol-related assaults.
Prior to Zueger, the North Dakota Supreme Court had never heard a
case where a plaintiff had brought a common law premises liability cause
of action against a tavernkeeper for injuries caused by an intoxicated
73. Id. The court further noted that:
Boomers' argument is premised upon the logical fallacy that, because 'all fault' under
comparative fault includes 'dram shop,' then "dram shop" must include 'all fault.'
Besides defying logic, Boomers' argument demonstrates a misreading of Stewart.
Stewart holds only that dram shop liability is to be considered in comparing fault under
N.D.C.C. ch. 32-03.2. It did not imply dram shop liability extends to supersede other
common law negligence claims.
Id.
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id. (citing Klein v. Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d 738, 742-43 (N.D. 1990)); see also supra note 6
(providing the relevant portions of Zueger, Kudma, and Boomer's release). In a footnote, the Court
stated:
Boomers argues there are insurmountable practical problems in attempting to try a case
where the dram shop claims have been settled. Zueger responds dram shop and alcohol
consumption will not be issues in the trial. Under our comparative fault law, however, it
appears Boomers is entitled to have all theories of fault submitted to the jury. See
N.D.C.C. § 32.-03.2-02. Accordingly, if requested by any party, the court should provide
separate interrogatories to the jury on Boomers' dram shop fault and common law fault,
and the jury is free to assess separate percentages of fault for those claims. Although we
recognize this procedure may be cumbersome and create confusion, any difficulties in
this regard were created by the parties when they settled the dram shop claims against
Boomers and expressly reserved for trial other claims against Boomers.
Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 97 n.3.
76. See Teshima, supra note 19, at 293-384 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
77. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 96.
78. Id.
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third person. 79 This lack of assertion arises, in part, out of the fact that
North Dakota has long had a codified cause of action for persons
injured by obviously intoxicated persons. 80 Also contributing to this
effect is section 1-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
purports to abolish common law, in cases where the law is declared by
code. 81 Finally, North Dakota's small population size limits fact patterns
that would give rise to a significant number of alcohol-related premises
liability cause of actions.
Now that the North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized common
law premises liability for tavernkeepers as an alternative to or a supple-
ment to a dram shop claim, plaintiffs will have more flexibility in their
claims process. In cases where a tavernkeeper is insured through
multiple policies, for example one dram shop policy and one premises
liability policy, it may be in the interest of all parties involved to settle as
soon as possible. Insurance companies may want to quickly offer settle-
ment through a contract releasing all claims of the type the insurance
company covers, and expressly leaving all other tort claims open.82 The
insurer settling first can then avoid litigation and pin a large portion of
liability on the remaining insurer(s).
Plaintiffs may also bring suit against multiple insurers, on multiple
theories of fault. 83 This could be especially helpful when there is a
strong question whether the assailant was obviously intoxicated. In these
cases, a plaintiff may not satisfy the requirements of the dram shop
statute. 84 Having a common law premises liability action joined to a
dram shop action gives a plaintiff an extra cushion of recovery if the
plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirements of the dram shop statute. 85
Rocky West Broncato
79. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 96. A tavernkeeper's duty to protect its patrons from third party
assaults was an issue of first impression in Zueger v. Carlson. Id.
80. See Daniel R. Conrad, Case Comment, 71 N.D. L. REV. 743, 750-51 (1994) (laying out the
history of North Dakota dram shop acts from 1877 to 1994). It is a fair assertion that a codified cause
of action seems to be the most logical place to start in any claim for relief.
81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987).
82. This scheme does not violate the general rule against splitting a cause of action, as long as the
release is express. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 97 n.3.
83. See id. (stating that plaintiffs in dram shop actions are entitled to have all theories of fault
submitted to the jury).
84. In order to be held liable under the dram shop act, a tavermkeeper must knowingly provide
alcoholic beverages to either a minor, an incompetent, or an obviously intoxicated person. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987). Common law premises liability actions do not focus on whether the assailant
was obviously intoxicated, but rather, whether the assault was foreseeable. Paula C. Murray, Premises
Liability: Owner Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties, 22 REAL EsT. L.J. 341,343 (1994).
85. A problem posed by cases in which dram shop and common law claims are joined is whether
the cause of action arises under the dramshop act, under the breach of common law duty, or under
both theories of liability. Manuel v. Weitzman, 191 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Mich. 1971).
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